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Abstract
This thematic review essay focuses on the relationship between social inclusion and collective skill for-
mation systems. It briefly surveys foundational literature in comparative political economy and comparative
social policy that documented and explained the traditionally socially inclusive nature of these systems. It
reviews how the literature conceptualized the current challenges faced by collective skill formation
systems in upholding their inclusive nature in the context of the transition to post-industrial societies. It
then discusses in detail a recent strand of literature that investigates the policy responses that have been
deployed across countries to deal with these challenges. It concludes by providing heuristics that may be
useful for researchers who seek to advance the study of the policy and politics of social inclusion in
collective skill formation systems.
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Introduction
The thematic review is motivated by a recent
surge of interest in the relationship between social
inclusion and collective skill formation systems1
in comparative political economy (CPE) and
comparative social policy (CSP) research (Bonoli
and Emmenegger, 2020; Bonoli and Wilson,
2019; Carstensen and Ibsen, 2019; Di Maio
et al., 2019, 2020; Durazzi and Geyer, 2020;
Ibsen and Thelen, 2020). This is not necessarily
surprising: the social inclusion ‘angle’ has long
been present in the literature on skill formation
(Soskice, 1994; Streeck, 1997). However, it is not
until very recently that it has come front and
centre in the study of skill formation systems. Yet,
as this body of literature quickly grew, some
seemingly conflicting findings began to emerge: a
vast array of policies have been categorized under
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the broad notion of ‘social inclusion’ and they
have been associated with different underlying
political dynamics. But how exactly do the dif-
ferent policies identified in this literature deliver
on their promise of furthering social inclusion?
And under what circumstances are the various
actors expected to matter in the underlying pol-
itics of policy change? At present, we lack ap-
propriate theoretical tools to answer these
questions because contributions to this fast-
growing body of literature have built on case
studies of specific policies and episodes of re-
form, each highlighting distinct policy measures
and underlying political dynamics. The value
added of this review stems from its endeavour to
take a bird’s-eye view on the existing literature
and to develop a framework that can accommo-
date theoretically the diversity in policy and
variation of politics that existing contributions
have focused on separately. Through the review,
we therefore hope to provide a useful heuristic for
this literature to move forward.
The article starts by reviewing some of the
foundational work (the second section) that pro-
vide the broad framework within which the more
recent contributions developed. It then delves into
the recent literature (the third section). The fourth
and fifth sections reflect upon the recent literature
by advancing broad typologies of socially inclu-
sive policies and the associated politics. The sixth
section draws the conclusions. Before proceeding,
a clarification on the scope of the article is in order:
we focus on a recent set of CPE/CSP contributions
that have come to form a coherent – and growing –
body of literature over the last few years. This
choice comes with the downside of excluding
from the review contributions from neighbouring
disciplines – such as sociology – that provide
micro-level evidence on how different socio-
economic groups transitioned into the voca-
tional training system and from the vocational
training system into the labour market (for ex-
ample, Protsch and Solga, 2016; Solga and
Kohlrausch, 2013). This literature provided cru-
cial insights on the extent to which training sys-
tems deliver socially inclusive outcomes, but for
the purposes of this review, we opt for an exclusive
focus on the macro-policy and political level as
per recent CPE/CSP contributions.
From social inclusion as a by-product
of industrial employment to social
exclusion as a side-effect
of post-industrialization
Vocational training systems gained prominence in
scholarly debates as part of broader research pro-
grammes aimed at shedding light on the diversity of
capitalist countries (Hall and Soskice, 2001). A great
deal of attention was particularly devoted to col-
lective skill formation systems, where cooperation
between employer associations and trade unions in
the design of training standards led to a plentiful
supply of workers whose skills fit firms’ needs (that
is, they are specific skills) but are also broad enough
to allow workers to move across firms within par-
ticular sectors (that is, they are also transferable)
(Estevez-Abe et al., 2001). Moreover, these systems
also appeared to be able to successfully integrate into
the training system and, subsequently, the labour
market, those pupils who are relatively less aca-
demically gifted, thereby combining equity and ef-
ficiency aims (Busemeyer, 2015; Iversen, 2005;
Soskice, 1994).
Crucially, however, these analyses refer primarily
to vocational education and training in manufactur-
ing-dominated political economies. This structural
feature is crucial to understanding why efficiency aims
could comfortably sit alongside equity ones in col-
lective skill formation systems; growing employment
in the manufacturing sector meant that manufacturing
firms offered plenty of apprenticeships, thereby ab-
sorbing a large number of school-leavers into their
training system before offering them a job. In this
context, applicants’ academic ability was not a central
concern in firms’ selection process, given that in-
dustrial production was not relying at large on aca-
demically oriented skills. Hence, academically weak
candidates – often from disadvantaged socio-
economic backgrounds – could be successfully inte-
grated in to the training system and the labour market.
As structural conditions changed, however, so did
the ability of collective skill formation systems to
perform a socially inclusive function. Two twin
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trends stood out in this respect: (i) the expansion of
service sector employment vis-à-vis the manufacturing
sector (Iversen and Wren, 1998; Wren, 2013) and (ii)
the rise of knowledge economies (Diessner et al., 2021;
Durazzi, 2019). The former took a toll on the sheer
quantity of available apprenticeships, the latter
heightened the skills requirements of apprenticeship
seekers. The joint effect of these two parallel trends
triggered exclusionary dynamics, decreasing the
likelihood of academically weaker pupils to land an
apprenticeship (Busemeyer, 2012; Martin and
Knudsen, 2010; Thelen, 2014). What strategies
did governments put in place to navigate this
challenge? We turn to this question in the next
section as we delve into the more recent literature.
Social inclusion front and centre of
the analysis
The previous section discussed how social inclusion
in collective skill formation has traditionally featured
in the CPE literature, without, however, being at its
core. This has changed over the last couple of years
when several articles put social inclusion front and
centre of the analysis (cf. Bonoli and Emmenegger,
2020; Bonoli and Wilson, 2019; Carstensen and
Ibsen, 2019; Di Maio et al., 2019; Di Maio et al.,
2020; Durazzi and Geyer, 2020). These articles share
a starting point: social inclusion is a dimension of
skill formation systems that deserves to be analysed
in and of itself as opposed of thinking of it as a by-
product of other dimensions.
Despite the common starting point, the empirical
focus is, however, rather diverse, reflecting the broad
range of measures that have been put in place. An
overall assessment allows us to identify four broad
mechanisms through which inclusion might be en-
hanced: (i) by lowering entry requirements to ap-
prenticeships; (ii) by incentivizing firms to offer
additional apprenticeships; (iii) by providing alter-
native forms of training to unsuccessful appren-
ticeship seekers; and (iv) by providing extra support
for disadvantaged candidates. It is worth noting here
that these four mechanisms reflect the focus of ex-
isting literature on policies that intervene directly on
the inclusiveness of collective training systems.
There are however other – indirect –ways in which it
is plausible that the inclusiveness of collective
training systems can be fostered. For instance, if
access to higher education is expanded, it is likely
that there will be a smaller pool of applicants for
apprenticeships, making access to vocational training
less competitive and – potentially – more inclusive.2
In this article, however, we focus on the inclusion-
enhancing measures that the recent literature has
identified and that are summarized in Table 1.
Such a variegated picture of socially inclusive
measures is matched by an equally variegated po-
litical landscape. The complexity of the politics of
social inclusion in collective training systems is well
illustrated in Carstensen and Ibsen (2019): their
historical account of the reform of training in Den-
mark shows the rise and fall of equality-oriented
coalitions, pointing at the complexity and instability
of the coalitional politics. The articles that look at
more recent instances of socially inclusive reforms
confirm such complexity.
Bonoli and Emmenegger (2020) conceptualize
the politics of social inclusion as a two-level game, in
which employers ultimately retain the upper hand.
The core contention is that business will consent to
socially inclusive measures only to the extent that
these measures do not threaten the self-governance of
the system. They think of the politics of social in-
clusion as a balancing act between its labour market
logic and its education system logic. In a labour
market logic, employers retain full control over the
selectivity of the skill formation system: it is up to
employers to decide how many apprenticeships are
to be offered and it is up to employers to select the
best candidates for each apprenticeship position. In
an education system logic, the integration of young
people in the training system prevails over the labour
market logic and governments might resort to one or
more of the measures highlighted in Table 1.
The upshot of Bonoli and Emmenegger’s analysis
is that business is in a position of structural advantage
in the relationship with the government. Given that
collective skill formation systems rest on the will-
ingness of firms to train, business associations can
use the anticipated behaviour of their members to
extract concessions from the government by in-
forming the government that their members will not
comply with a given socially inclusive measure (see
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also Busemeyer, 2012). Even if governments suc-
cessfully introduce a socially inclusive measure,
individual firms can still quash its implementation.
This is illustrated with the case of the German
Ausbildungsbonus, which provided public financial
incentives for firms to train. The policy was adopted
despite business (and unions) voicing their discon-
tent. But once the policy was adopted, firms simply
did not use the bonus to the extent that was foreseen
by the government. As the policy was severely un-
derachieving its targets, it was discontinued by the
government (Bonoli and Emmenegger, 2020; Geyer,
forthcoming). Does this mean that socially inclusive
measures can only develop to the extent that business
consents to them? Not necessarily. Other contribu-
tions highlight that different political dynamics may
also emerge.
Di Maio et al. (2020) show for instance that the
introduction of two-year apprenticeships in Swit-
zerland was the outcome of a process initiated by the
government despite some initial scepticism from the
business community. Nonetheless, they also show
that the government was aware of employers’
preferences and anticipated them. This shaped a
policy process whereby the government introduced
two-year apprenticeships despite employers’ scep-
ticism but quickly stepped back and left the newly
introduced policy within the realm of the social
partners’ self-governance. Di Maio and colleagues
refer to this process as ‘polite employer domination’.
This perspective suggests that governments might be
able to strategically anticipate business preferences
and achieve socially inclusive reforms by, for ex-
ample, forcing employers’ hands in the political
arena but then stepping back to preserve their self-
governance, and therefore not antagonizing business,
when it comes to implementing a given policy on the
ground.
Finally, Durazzi and Geyer (2020) shift the focus
away from business and governments to focus on the
role of unions. This contribution suggests that a
policy initiative strongly advocated by the unions,
which found government’s political support, might
be successfully implemented despite business op-
position. The argument is based on the successful
introduction of a non-firm-based training in Austria,
which caters for unsuccessful apprenticeship seekers.
This form of training – referred to as supra-company
apprenticeship – offers a guaranteed training place to
young people who cannot find a regular appren-
ticeship. It mimics a ‘normal’ apprenticeship insofar
trainees share their time between practical and the-
oretical learning, and it leads to same certification as
a regular apprenticeship. But the practical component
takes place in a training workshop, rather than in-
firm. This type of training is therefore ‘dual’ because
apprentices receive theoretical and practical training,
but not ‘collective’ because training is provided by
public financed workshops and not private compa-
nies.3 Durazzi and Geyer note that this solution was
successfully pursued in Austria but similar ar-
rangements were unsuccessful in Germany and they
put this down to the strategies of trade unions that
depend in turn on the institutional context within
which they operate, which led to a pro-inclusion
coalition between the unions and the government
in Austria but not in Germany (see also Busemeyer,
2012).
At this point, two main aspects of the recent lit-
erature on social inclusion in collective skill for-
mation systems should have become apparent: (i) the
empirical focus is broad-ranging, covering a wide
variety of policy measures; and (ii) partly as a logical
consequences of (i), the explanations of success and
failure of socially inclusive policies is equally var-
iegated. The next two sections aim to systematically
reorganize the findings of the recent literature on both
the policy and politics fronts.
Policy: between selection and stratification
This section asks the following questions: Are the
wide array of policy measures identified in the recent
literature and summarized in Table 1 all equally
inclusive? and Is a single dimension (more or less
inclusion) enough to adequately capture them? We
suggest that a two-dimensional classification might
do a better job. To understand why two dimensions
might be desirable, we need to combine one insight
of the recent literature with one insight of the older
literature summarized in the second section. The
recent literature alerts us to the increasing problems
that collective skill formation systems face when it
comes to offering training places to disadvantaged
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candidates. But the older literature – when outlining
the socially inclusive nature of collective skill for-
mation systems – pointed not only at their ability to
offer training to disadvantaged school-leavers but
also at their ability of giving them good life chances.
In other words, to fully capture the socially in-
clusive nature of the policy measures, we should not
only focus on the point of entry (that is, whether
disadvantaged candidates are integrated into the
training system) but also on the point of exit (that is,
whether the certifications that they receive put them
at a disadvantage in the labour market vis-à-vis
graduates of the regular system). We capture the
former in the weakly selective – strongly selective
axis and the latter in the stratifying – de-stratifying
axis in Figure 1. To locate a policy measure along the
selection axis, we thus ask the following question:
Does the given policy have built-in mechanisms to
increase the number of training places to be provided
and therefore make access to the system less selec-
tive? The assumption here is that the more places are
offered, the easier it is for candidates to land an
apprenticeship, making it more likely that (also)
disadvantaged candidates are offered a place. If,
conversely, the supply of apprenticeships shrinks, we
expect disadvantaged candidates to be dispropor-
tionately affected. Policies that ultimately depend on
firms’ willingness to offer training and do not alter
their incentives to offer training are at the strongly
selective end of the spectrum. Policies that either do
not depend on firms’willingness or that offer explicit
incentives for firms to provide additional training are
at the weakly selective end of the spectrum.
Turning to the stratification axis, we pose the
following question: Does the given policy provide
trainees with inferior certification or prolong their
transition from school to employment compared to
graduates of the regular system? If they do, then
these policies locate at the stratifying end of the
spectrum, if they do not, they will be placed at the de-
stratifying end. Our conceptualization of (de-)strat-
ifying measures builds in particular on insights from
Figure 1. The policy space of socially inclusive measures.
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the comparison between the transition system and the
regular firm-based system in Germany. The former
does not lead to fully qualifying certifications and,
for this reason, it has often been criticized as an
unnecessary ‘waiting loop’ further disadvantaging
those pupils who cannot find regular apprenticeships.
Hence, if a measure leads to equal certification
within the same timeframe as the regular firm-based
system, we consider it de-stratifying. The actual
implementation of these measures, however, returns
a more complex picture. Equal certification provided
outside the regular firm-based system is well-
respected in the labour market in some cases (for
example, Austria, cf. Durazzi and Geyer, 2020),
while it is de facto considered of lower value in other
cases (for example, Denmark, cf. Ibsen and Thelen,
2020). While recognizing this complexity, it still
seems appropriate to place measures that provide
equal certification at the de-stratifying end of the
spectrum compared to measures that do not offer
equal certification given that there are empirical
examples demonstrating that the former can be de-
signed in such a way as to play a ‘de-stratifying’ role,
while the latter are ‘stratifying’ by design. Yet, the
different de facto value of non-firm-based training in
Austria and Denmark further testifies to the com-
plexity of enhancing social inclusion in vocational
training systems while maintaining their attractive-
ness in the labour market. Combining the ‘selection’
and ‘stratification’ dimensions, we are able to locate
the various policy measures listed in Table 1 across
the four possible quadrants of Figure 1.
The top-right corner features a policy that is both
weakly selective and de-stratifying: non-firm-based
training is weakly selective because it offers a
guarantee, under-written by the state, of a training
place for unsuccessful apprenticeship seekers,4 and it
is de-stratifying because training is of equal quality
and duration as regular apprenticeships and it leads to
the same nationally recognized certification as a
regular apprenticeship. Located further to the left are
levies and bonuses. They weaken selection because
they provide explicit incentives for firms to train
more, but they do so to a lesser extent than non-firm-
based training because the final decision as whether
to hire apprentices still remains with employers.
Furthermore, they are de-stratifying because they
aim at creating additional training places in the
regular apprenticeship system.
The bottom-right corner features policy measures
like remedial training that – similarly to the case of
non-firm-based training – provide a state-backed
guarantee of a training place but – different to the
case of non-firm-based training – they lead to cer-
tificates of inferior quality. They are, in other words,
weakly selective but also stratifying. This is one key
difference between the Austrian supra-company
training (that is, a case of non-firm-based training)
and the German transition system (that is, case of
remedial training).
Moving to the left-hand side of the figure, we find
in the top-left quadrant a number of policies that
potentially support the inclusion of disadvantaged
candidates into regular apprenticeships by giving
them extra support before or during the appren-
ticeship (in the case of, respectively, counselling and
orientation services and supported apprenticeships)
or through commitments on the side of firms to
provide more apprenticeships. These measures are
de-stratifying because beneficiaries would access the
regular apprenticeship system – but whether they do
access the system is a decision that remains firmly in
the hands of business and there are no additional
incentives provided by the state to increase the offer
of apprenticeships (as in the case of levies and bo-
nuses). They are therefore policies that are de-
stratifying but also strongly selective.
Finally, the case of shorter apprenticeships is one
of relatively strong selection and stratification when
set in the context of the other inclusive measures:
they are strongly selective because ultimately
whether to offer these apprenticeships to disadvan-
taged applicants remains a decision for firms to
make; and they are also stratifying because they offer
a certification of inferior quality compared to a
regular apprenticeship (although of higher quality
compared to remedial training, hence they are placed
above remedial training in the stratification axis). By
resorting to the proposed bi-dimensional categori-
zation outlined in Figure 1, we might therefore be
able to get at a more fine-grained understanding of
the policy measures that have been put in place in
recent years to enhance social inclusion in col-
lective skill formation systems. But what about the
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underlying politics? We turn to this question in the
next section.
Politics: between intrusion and co-dependence
We suggest that the politics of socially inclusive
reforms can be also meaningfully systematized by
resorting to a bi-dimensional space. Time and again,
the literature showed that employers vigorously
fought off unilateral government intervention into
vocational training and sought to preserve its self-
governance through social partnership (Busemeyer,
2012; Bonoli and Emmenegger, 2020; Carstensen
and Ibsen, 2019; Durazzi and Geyer, 2020). This is a
crucial dimension of the politics of training that we
capture in Figure 2 using the notion of intrusion (cf.
Bonoli and Wilson, 2019; Bonoli and Emmenegger,
2020). Intrusive measures are those that weaken
employers’ control over how many apprenticeships
are offered. They can do so directly by altering the
incentive-set underpinning employers’ decision to
offer apprenticeships or indirectly by providing al-
ternative pathways that might divert potential
applicants away. If, on the other hand, the measures
do not curtail firms’ ability to select candidates or do
not enter in competition with the regular system,
these are considered as low intrusion measures.
The second dimension qualifies the view that
business is in a privileged political position (Bonoli
and Emmenegger, 2020; Busemeyer, 2012). We
suggest that this maxim is often – but not always –
true. Using the notion of co-dependence (cf.
Culpepper and Reinke, 2014), we note that not all the
measures listed in Table 1 require business in-
volvement for their implementation. At high levels of
co-dependence, we hypothesize business buy-in to
be necessary for a given measure to be successfully
implemented or even adopted. But measures that do
not depend on business’ involvement, that is, at
lower levels of co-dependence, can be introduced
even against business’ opposition.5 Combining the
two dimensions, we are able to locate the various
policy measures listed in Table 1 across the four
possible quadrants of Figure 2.
The top-right corner features those measures that
are most difficult to pass or implement. These are
Figure 2. The political space of socially inclusive measures.
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training levy and, somewhat lower on the intru-
siveness scale, training bonus. In both cases, gov-
ernment intervention is expected to alter firms’
incentive to train. As expected, firms have been
strongly against any form of levy (Busemeyer, 2012;
Durazzi and Geyer, 2020). Business opposes training
bonuses less vigorously than levies because bonuses
provide carrots (in the form of subsidies) but – unlike
levies – they do not impose sticks (that is, the
subsidies come from the public purse, not from firms
who do not train). However, training bonuses are
viewed as intrusive because financial incentives may
lead firms to hire apprentices for short-termmonetary
gains, which employer organizations perceive as
detrimental to the long-term stability of the training
system (Bonoli and Emmenegger, 2020; Geyer,
forthcoming). Importantly, business is in a privi-
leged position to push back on these measures be-
cause the success of these measures depends on the
continued willingness of firms to train. Moreover,
high levels of co-dependence also make unions’
preferences less politically relevant. In the top-right
corner, business is therefore the pivotal actor, and we
expect business to exploit its pivotal position to
quash intrusive measures at high-levels of co-
dependence in line with the theorization provided
by Bonoli and Emmenegger (2020). The political
logic that applies in this quadrant is one of ‘business
dominance’.
The picture is different in the bottom-right corner.
Here intrusive measures have the potential to be
adopted even without employer support because,
given low co-dependence, business does not have an
equally strong veto power. The typical intrusive
measure with a low level of co-dependence on
business is the establishment of non-firm-based
training systems leading to equal certification as
the regular system. This system is intrusive because,
given equal certification, business might fear that it
enters into competition with the regular system and
siphon out potential applicants (but recall note 5 on
the strategies that governments might adopt to ensure
that non-firm-based training is complementary to –
not competitive with – the firm-based training sys-
tem). On the other hand, it does not depend on
business: the practical component of training takes
place in a public setting and not in-firm. This is the
political context analysed by Durazzi and Geyer
(2020), in which unions – not business – are the
pivotal actor. A parallel system of non-firm-based
training was established in Austria, where the unions
sided with the government in favour of its estab-
lishment but not in Germany, where the unions sided
with the employers against it. The reason for these
different coalitions has been found in the different
institutional contexts: in the Austrian context, the
unions exert the same – if not higher – control over
non-firm-based training as they do in the regular
system; while in the German case, they perceived
their control over training to be lower as training
moved out of the regular system. The political logic
that applies in this quadrant is therefore one of
‘competition’ between the regular training systems
and alternative – equally qualifying – paths. We posit
that the outcome of such competition between pol-
icies will ultimately depend on the stance that unions
take.
The top-left corner, in turn, offers the opportunity
for more cooperative solutions. Here employers have
the upper hand because all these measures (shorter
apprenticeships, supported apprenticeships and
voluntary agreements) need their consent to be
successfully implemented. In this case, however, it is
conceivable that employers do consent to them be-
cause these measures neither enter in competition
with the regular system (for example, because they
offer lower qualifications) nor do they weaken
business’ control over the system. This scenario is
consistent with the notion of ‘polite employer
domination’ (DiMaio et al., 2020), whereby business
might consent to socially inclusive measures because
these do not alter their pre-eminent role in the
governance of the system. Business, in other words,
is pivotal in this quadrant too, but it is not necessarily
expected to use its pivotal position to torpedo in-
clusive measures. Moreover, this is also the quadrant
that accommodates policy measures that reflect a
political compromise. For instance, voluntary
agreements in Germany have been proposed by
business to ensure that the far more threatening
option of a levy was off the table (Durazzi and Geyer,
2020; Geyer, forthcoming). The political logic that
prevails in this quadrant is therefore one of ‘political
exchange’.
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Finally, the bottom-left quadrant is home to those
policy options that are politically easiest to introduce.
At low levels of intrusion and low levels of co-
dependence, we expect social partners to let the
government develop socially inclusive measures.
The political logic that applies in this quadrant is
therefore one of ‘facilitation’,6 that is consisting of
measures that are politically easy for governments to
introduce. However, these also tend to be ‘weak’
measures because – going back to Figure 1 – they are
either stratifying or tend toward the strongly selective
end of the spectrum.
Conclusion
This article reviewed foundational literature that
highlighted the socially inclusive nature of col-
lective skill formation systems in industrial so-
cieties and documented the increasing difficulties
in upholding this socially inclusive nature in post-
industrial knowledge-based economies. It then
focused on recent literature that placed social
inclusion front and centre of the analysis, re-
vealing wide variations in the policies that have
been identified as socially inclusive and in the
underlying politics that led to particular policy
choices. To systematize such variations, the ar-
ticle proposed two broad heuristics: on the policy
side, it advanced a bi-dimensional categorization
based on the degree of selection and stratification
that different policy measures display; on the
political side, it delineated a bi-dimensional po-
litical space within which these policy measures
develop, employing the concepts of intrusion and
co-dependence.
As advanced capitalist countries strive to turn
their welfare states into social investment states,
vocational training systems have a potentially key
role to play. But the social investment potential of
vocational training systems can be fully unleashed
only if their economic efficiency and social inclusion
functions are successfully (re-)combined. It is
therefore of paramount importance to understand the
policy and politics that can nurture a symbiotic re-
lationship between social inclusion and economic
efficiency in collective skill formation systems. This
thematic review hopes to further stimulate this line of
research as well as to have provided useful analytical
tools to be employed for its pursuit.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Patrick Emmenegger for insightful
and encouraging feedback on the early idea of this thematic
review as well as two anonymous reviewers and the
journal’s editor Janine Leschke for helpful comments.
Errors and omissions are ours.
Declaration of conflicting interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest
with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication
of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the re-
search, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
ORCID iD
Niccolo Durazzi  https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7581-
5595
Notes
1. Collective skill formation systems are commonly as-
sociated with dual apprenticeships and found primarily
in countries such as Germany, Austria, Switzerland and
Denmark (cf. Busemeyer and Trampusch, 2012). We
focus on these systems for two main reasons: (i) we are
driven by existing literature, which analysed over the
last few years how these particular training systems strived
to uphold social inclusion (see the third section); (ii) al-
though collective training systems are well-established
only in a handful of countries, this is the model that
policymakers from other countries have tried to ‘import’
and that European institutions have tried to promote across
Europe (see, for example, the European Alliance for
Apprenticeships established by the European Commis-
sion). Hence, collective training systems have a special
place in vocational education and training that transcend
the borders of those countries in which they are prevalent.
2. Investigating developments in other parts of the edu-
cation system that might have an impact on the potential
for social inclusion of collective skill formation systems
appears as an interesting avenue for future research. We
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are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for making this
suggestion.
3. Acknowledging the dual – but not collective – nature of
non-firm-based training prompts a broader observation,
namely, several measures that have been put in place to
shore up collective training systems are not subject
themselves to the logic of collective governance (for
example, counselling measures; remedial training in
addition to non-firm-based training). They have none-
theless been developed to address a problem (that is, the
lack of training opportunities) that originates firmly
within the collective training system.
4. To be sure, there are likely limits to the number of
training places that can be offered in non-firm-based
training. We expect in particular governments to resort
to this system counter-cyclically to bridge the shortfall
of apprenticeship positions at particular points in time
rather than aiming at replacing the dual system alto-
gether in the long term – the latter being an option that
neither governments nor social partners have reasons to
support. We nonetheless recognize that this balancing
act may be challenging: while it seems to have been
achieved successfully in Austria (Durazzi and Geyer,
2020), it has been far more problematic in the case of
Denmark where the expansion of non-firm-based
training contributed to lowering the overall attractive-
ness of the vocational training system (Ibsen and
Thelen, 2020). Future research should shed light on
the exact mechanisms through which governments
ensure that non-firm-based training reinforces – rather
than undermines – the dual training system.
5. The co-dependence axis maps closely onto the internal–
external dimension developed by Bonoli and Wilson
(2019). We prefer – however – the term co-dependence
as in our view it foreshadows more explicitly the po-
litical power that business can exert on a given measure.
6. We are thankful to an anonymous reviewer for the
suggestion of introducing the political logic that we
expect to play out in each quadrant.
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